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USURY IMPLICATIONS OF FRONT-END INTEREST
AND INTEREST IN ADVANCE
by B. Prater Monning, III
The moneylender has never enjoyed complete freedom in the pursuit of
his profession, primarily due to the usury laws. Disdain of the "usurer" is of
ancient origin,' and the prohibition of excessive interest has its basis in the
religious,2 philosophical,3 and literary4 history of the western world. Today,
usury is a matter of state law, 5 almost all states having some type of usury
statute.6 In addition, most states have sophisticated provisions for special
loans, most notable of which are corporate exceptions statutes7 and consum-
er protection laws. 8
In a tight-money market, when the market rate of interest approaches the
maximum legal rate, the restraining influence of the usury laws forces
lenders to discontinue conventional modes of lending and to develop new,
perhaps more profitable, perhaps illegal, methods. This Comment will
1. The CODE OF HAMMURABI § 51 (ca. 1600 B.C.) prohibited exhorbitant rates of
interest. In addition, there were usury statutes in ancient China, the KORAN OF
MOHAMMED, and the TWELVE TABLES OF ROME. In early Athens moneylenders were
viewed with such public contempt that legislation could serve no further purpose.
Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367, 376 (N.Y. 1819).
2. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 23:20; Exodus 22:25; Leviticus 25:36-37; Nehemiah 5:7,
10-12; Ezekiel 18:8 (Mod. Eng. ed.). See also W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 482-84(B. Gavit ed. 1941); H. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 64-65 (1971);
Frierson, Changing Concepts of Usury: Ancient Times Through the Times of John
Calvin, 7 AM. Bus. L.J. 115 (1970).
3. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, c.10; F. BACON, MORAL ESSAYS; OF
USURY (1625); J. BENTHAM, DEFENSE OF USURY (1841); PLATO, DIALOGUES 124 (B.Jowett trans. 1931). See also J. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY 351-52 (1936); B. NELSON, THE IDEA OF USURY (1949); Frierson, supra
note 2; Noonan, Tokos and Atokion: An Examination of the Natural Law Reasoning
Against Usury and Against Contraception, 10 NAT. L. FORUM 215 (1965).
4. See, e.g., DANTE, DIVINE COMEDY, Inferno, Canto 17:45; W. SHAKESPEARE,
MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act 2, Scene 1:129-35. See also Note, Shakespeare and the Legal
Process: Four Essays, 61 VA. L. REV. 390, 402-11 (1975).
5. National banks are limited in their lending practices by state usury laws. 12
U.S.C. § 85 (1945). See generally Morris, The Laws of Usury as Applied to National
Banks, 81 BANKING L.J. 847 (1964).
6. Massachusetts is the only exception. See the discussion in Merriman & Hanks,
Revising State Usury Statutes in Light of a Tight Money Market, 27 MD. L. REV. 1, 8
(1967).
7. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974), which
provides that loans to corporations may carry interest up to 18%, rather than 10%
which is the ceiling to individuals as provided in TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-
1.02 (1971). See generally Comment, Using a "Dummy" Corporate Borrower Creates
Usury and Tax Difficulties, 28 Sw. L.J. 437 (1974). The Dallas court of civil appeals
recently held in Skeen & Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ) that the Texas corporate exception statute allows incorpo-
ration for the sole purpose of avoiding the usury laws.
8. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-2.01 to -50.06 (1971). See
generally Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law Concerning Con-
sumer Credit, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 37 (1974). The Texas Consumer Credit Code provides
for numerous classifications of consumer loans and lenders, allowing in some instances
up to 240% interest. Comment, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-The Case for
the Consumer, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 1001, 1026 (1971). See also Pub. L. No. 93-501(Oct. 29, 1974), which supersedes state law insofar as loans of a business or agricul-
tural nature are concerned. Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29
Sw. L.J. 29, 44-45 (1975), discusses several problems raised by this legislation.
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discuss usury implications of two such methods, interest in advance and
front-end interest, placing particular emphasis upon Texas decisions relating
to the operation of, and the interest computations necessitated by the use of
these two methods.
Perhaps due to confusion of interest in advance with front-end interest, the
Sixty-Fourth Legislature of Texas has seen fit ,to codify the so-called "spread-
ing" concept for the computation of interest rates on loans secured by any
interest in real property.9 This Comment will discuss the background, need,
and validity of that legislation.
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
The Revised Statutes of Texas define usury as "interest in excess of the
amount allowed by law,"'10 and in the normal, non-corporate," commercial
situation the law allows a maximum rate of "ten per cent per annum.' x2
Case law defines usury as including three elements: (1) an agreement to
lend money; (2) an absolute obligation of the borrower to repay the
principal; and (3) greater compensation (interest) than that allowed by
law.' 3 There is considerable authority for the proposition that there must
exist an intent on the part of the lender to charge usurious interest,14 but
cases have seldom turned on ,the issue.15 In fact, intent has been found self-
evident where the loan was usurious on its face.' 6
The major problems regarding usury implications of front-end interest and
interest in advance loans revolve around the determination of the actual or
true principal" amount of a loan and the methods of applying interest
charges to that principal. Because of basic differences in the two types of
loans, it will be necessary at the outset to distinguish them from one another
and to familiarize the reader with their operation.
9. Ch. 26, §§ 1-4, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 47-48, to be codified as TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07. The law affects only those loans consummated after
Sept. 2, 1975. Id.
10. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.01(d) (1971).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. TEX. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (1971).
13. See generally Pearce & Williams, Punitive Past to Current Convenience-A
Study of the Texas Law of Usury, 22 Sw. L.J. 233, 236-37 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Dorfman v. Smith, 517 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1974, no writ); Hernandez v. United States Fin. Co., 441 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1969, writ dism'd).
15. See Note, Usury-A Loan Can be Usurious Even Though the Lender Has No
Intent To Charge Interest Above the Statutory Maximum, 48 TExAs L. REv. 711 (1970).
The intent requirement is to a degree implicit in the penalty provision of the Texas usury
laws: "[T]here shall be no penalty for a violation which results from an accidental or
bona fide error." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (1971). Also, the federal
penalty provision requires scienter as a prerequisite to recovery. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1970).
16. Moser v. John F. Buckner & Sons, 292 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1956, writ ref'd) (applying doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); accord, Freeman v. Hernandez,
521 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); Johns v. Jaeb, 518 S.W.2d 857
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
17. By actual or true principal is meant the actual amount of money loaned to the
borrower by the lender. The "stated" principal on the face of a loan agreement is
frequently more than the true principal, particularly in loans involving front-end interest
where an amount is subtracted from the principal before advancement. For usury




A. Interest in Advance
Simply stated, interest in advance is interest actually paid before the
borrower has had the use of the borrowed funds for the time period for
which such interest is charged.' 8 Such transactions generally entail a higher
rate of interest being charged and paid in the early years of a loan period
than is charged and paid in later years. Functionally, the lender will compute
the amount of interest chargeable on a given principal at a straight-line rate
over an entire loan period, and deduct sums which would ordinarily accrue
in later years; he will then "squeeze" 19 such sums into the interest payments
in earlier years of the loan term. For example, consider a loan of $1,000 for
five years, with interest only payable at the end of each year and principal
payable in lump sum at the end of the loan term. The lender will first
compute the maximum amount of interest chargeable, which, assuming a ten
percent maximum rate,20 will be $100 per year: $500 for the entire loan
term. Rather than charging $100 interest in the first and second years of
the loan term, the interest in advance lender will require $125, "squeez-
ing" $25 into those charges. The "squeezed" interest will be balanced by
charging only $75 interest in the fourth and fifth years of the loan term. The
payment schedule would thus appear: 21








Thus, while the lender will charge and receive only $500 over the entire loan
term, his rate of return is considerably greater in the interest in advance
transaction than in a transaction calling for a straight-line rate ($100 per
year). From the standpoint of the usury laws, the major thrust of interest in
advance is that in the early years of the loan term it imposes upon the
borrower the obligation to pay interest for a greater length of time than he
has had the use of the principal amount of the loan.
18. As will be noted later, front-end interest is never actually paid at the "front-end"
of a loan, but is applied to a reduction of the stated principal amount of the loan. It is
therefore actually paid only when the stated principal is paid to the lender. See discussion
at notes 76-79 infra and accompanying text.
19. The "squeezing" label for such loans was first used by the Texas Commission of
Appeals in Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940).
20. As provided by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (1971). For the
purpose of this Comment, a 10% maximum rate of interest will be assumed, unless
otherwise indicated.
21. This sample transaction is adopted from those presented by the available
opinions. See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940)
(discussed inlra notes 35-40 and accompanying text); Commerce Trust Co. v. Best, 124
Tex. 583, 80 S.W.2d 942 (1935); Dallas Trust & Say. Bank v. Brashear, 65 S.W.2d 288
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted). More complex interest in advance transac-
tions are possible. See, e.g., Riverdrive Mall v. Larwin Mortgage Inv., 515 S.W.2d 5
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ); Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County
Seed & Delinting, Inc., 476 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), writ ref'd
n.r.e., per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974).
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It is unfortunate that courts and commentators have been inconsistent in
the labeling of loan transactions,2 2 and this has perhaps contributed to
widespread confusion of interest in advance analysis with front-end interest
analysis. 23 Suffice it to say that it is essential to a proper understanding of
the analysis in this Comment to plant the above example of the interest in
advance transaction firmly in one's mind. A useful tool for testing one's
understanding of "true" interest in advance is a brief discussion of a peculiar
line of cases involving error in judicial nomenclature regarding discounted
interest on short-term 24 loans.
Courts have frequently referred to a certain variety of short-term loans as
involving "interest in advance." Because of the "interest in advance" connota-
tion it is necessary to distinguish such loans from the true interest in advance
situation discussed above. The typical short-term "interest in advance" loan
is one in which the borrower will make a short-term note for a "principal"
sum, but the lender's advance will be discounted or reduced by an amount
of interest charged on the "principal." Thus, when the borrower pays his
"principal" note, his payment will include both interest and true principal.
Contrary to logic, courts have always allowed a discount of ten percent on
short-term loans. 25
The "discount" transaction differs from the true interest in advance trans-
action in two ways; the stated principal amount of the loan is more than the
true principal; and the final "principal" payment includes both interest and
principal. The discounted interest is actually paid at the end of the loan
term, while interest in advance is paid early in the loan term.2 6
B. Front-end Interest; Points
The term "front-end interest" has been used to denote a fee or charge,
received by the lender, in consideration for the loan of money, at the
inception of the loan.27 Such fees or charges are ordinarily in addition to the
22. See, e.g., Bethke v. Idaho Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Idaho 410, 462 P.2d 503
(1969); Pierce & Williams, supra note 13, at 246-47; Comment, Usury in Texas:
Spreading Interest Over the Entire Period of the Loan, 12 Hous. L. REv. 159 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Loiseaux, Some Usury Problems in Commercial Lending, 49 TEXAS L.
REV. 419, 426-30 (1971); Pierce & Williams, supra note 13, at 246-47; Comment, supra
note 22.
24. For the purposes of this Comment, short-term loans are those which run no
longer than one year.
25. The practice of allowing discounts at the maximum rate was first established by
the English Statute of Usury, 13 Anne, c. 15 (1713), and has been followed without
exception. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1504 (1962); 2 PATTON'S DIGEST, Interest &
Usury § 15 (1942, Supp. 1951); 14 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS '§ 1694 (3d ed. 1972). An
expansion of the practice is followed in Oklahoma, where discounting for the first year
of a multi-year loan is allowed. Pickering v. Taylor, 67 P.2d 949 (Okla. 1937).
Insofar as the usury laws are concerned the effect of allowance is not monumental; it
merely allows a maximum rate of 11% rather than 10%. This is algebraically shown as
follows: When the stated principal is $X, the highest interest deductible will be 10% of
$X, or $(X/10). The amount actually loaned will be $X minus the interest deduction, or
$(X-X/I10). Computing the true rate of interest (I), the formula is: X/10 = I(X-
X/10); eliminating X, I = 1/9, or .111. This formula assumes the borrower will be
allowed to retain the "true" principal during the entire year. An installment loan would
require a different formula, but the result would be substantially similar.
26. See notes 68-74 infra and accompanying text for application of the above
analysis to the distinction between interest in advance and front-end interest.
27. See note 32 infra.
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stated interest rate on the face of the loan and may or may not be referred to
as interest by the loan contract. In fact, front-end interest often results from
a judicial determination that sundry "loan fees" are not bona-fide.28 For
example, consider a borrower, seeking a loan of $1,000, and a lender who
agrees to make the loan at eight percent, but requires the borrower to "pay"
a five percent processing fee. The lender will advance the $1,000 to the
borrower, and the borrower will immediately pay the lender the $50 (5
percent) fee. It requires only the shallowest of logic to see that only $950
has actually been loaned. 29 However, the front-end interest lender will
charge interest on the full $1,000.
In the more usual situation, a borrower will expect to "pay" a certain
number of "points" at the front-end of a loan. In such a case there is
generally no question that the "points" are consideration for the loan of
money: interest. However, interest is still charged on a stated principal with
no reductive allowance for the "points." Both judicial30 and contractual 3l
front-end interest are treated identically for usury determinations.
Perhaps it would be more appropriate to discontinue the use of the term
"front-end interest" since; as will be later discussed, the charges do not
operate as interest at the front-end of a loan but are allocated by the courts
in the determination of usury to a reduction of the stated principal. This is
universally recognized in the lending business and in some jurisdictions
where the term "point" is preferred.3 2 The use of "points" rather than
"front-end interest" also avoids etymological problems that arise in distin-
guishing front-end interest loans from interest in advance loans.3 3 Neverthe-
less, most courts seem to have a certain affinity for the term front-end
interest, 'and for the purpose of this Comment the terms will be used
interchangeably.
II. USURY AND INTEREST IN ADVANCE
Use of the interest in -advance transaction is a means of relief to the lender
who finds his margin of profit pinched by the usury laws. By converting late
gain, interest which would ordinarily accrue in the final period of a loan
28. See notes 75-76 infra and accompanying text.
29. See note 79 infra.
30. Meaning front-end interest resulting from a judicial nonacceptance of "loan
fees."
31. Meaning "points" or other charges known to be, and considered by the parties
as, interest.
32. Since the late 1940's the term 'point' has been a term of general usage
in the mortgage lending industry . . . [Point] simply denotes a fee or
charge equal to one per cent (1%) of the principal amount of the loan
which is collected by the lender at the time the loan is made . . . . The
basic tenet to remember is that it is a fee or charge which is collected only
once, at the inception of the loan, and is in addition to the constant
long term stated interest rate on the face of the loan.
B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park N., 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d 591, 595 n.2 (1968).
Statutes in Maryland and Virginia employ the use of the term. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 69-
188, 1969-1 CuNi. BULL. 54, stating that a "loan processing fee" fits into the general
term "points."
33. See, e.g., Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511
S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref d n.r.e., per curiam, 516 S.W.2d 136
(Tex. 1974), discussed in notes 56-67 infra and accompanying text.
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term, into early gain, the lender converts money foregone into money
available for other loans. Though the interest payments received by the
lender in the final period of the loan will be reduced, the lender by that time
will have had the use of funds equal to the reduction for some time. The
benefits derivative of the interest in advance transaction are not, however,
irrevocable, for the transaction runs the risk of usury's taint and commensu-
rate penalties.34
The General Rule. In Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp8 5 a loan of $50,000 for
ten years was evidenced by a note with ten interest coupons, each represent-
ing six and one-half percent interest for one year and due at the end of each
consecutive year.8 6 ,Four promissory notes were also executed, such notes
representing two and one-half percent interest for ten years.8 7 However, the
latter four notes were due in the first four years of the loan term. The Texas
Commission of Appeals, affirming the judgment of the court of civil ap-
peals,38 held that, because the borrower was required to pay more than ten
percent interest in each of the first four years of the loan, it was usurious.39
The rule applied by the court is, simply stated, that interest in excess of the
legal rate paid in early years cannot be balanced against interest less than the
legal rate in later years to save the transaction from the taint of usury. 40
In transactions involving interest in advance, the full amount of the
"stated" principal is delivered to the borrower, thus making the question
whether the interest rate is to be computed on the "true" or "stated"
principal of no moment. 41 The sole consideration is that part of the interest
34. Penalties are provided 'by Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (1971),discussed in Pierce & Williams, supra note 13, at 247-49, and Loiseaux, supra note 23, at
441-42.
35. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940).
36. Each of the ten coupons was for $3,250. No principal was due until the end of
the ten-year loan term. Thus, the ten coupons amounted to 6 % interest on $50,000
for ten years. Id. at 86, 138 S.W.2d at 532.
37. The four notes were for $3,125 each, totalling $12,500, or 2 % interest on$50,000 for ten years. Id. at 87, 138 S.W.2d at 532.
38. Commerce Farm Credit Co. v. Ramp, 166 S.W.2d 1144 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1938), af'd sub nom. Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d
531 (1940).
39. [T]he additional 2Y2 per cent interest on the principal of the loan was
'squeezed' into four annual payments of $3,125 each, instead of being
spread over the ten-year period of the loan, and this resulted in making
the rate for the first four years in excess of 10 per cent per annum.
135 Tex. at 87, 138 S.W.2d at 533. Had the court applied all the coupons and notes to
the full ten-year term, the rate would have been only 9%.40. See Pierce & Williams, supra note 13, at 246-47. See also Dallas Trust & Say.
Bank v. Brashear, 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted). In Brashear
the loan was of a principal amount of $3,000 for ten years, evidenced by notes of $200due at the end of the second, third, and fourth years, and a note for $2,400 due at the
end of the tenth year. These notes bore interest until maturity at 7%. A "second
mortgage" secured payment of five additional interest notes of $102 due consecutively in
the first five years. Since the "second mortgage" notes were to be paid in the first fiveyears and not over the entire ten-year term, and therefore exceeded the maximum
allowable interest for the shorter period, the loan was held usurious. See also Commerce
Trust Co. v. Best, 124 Tex. 583, 80 S.W.2d 942 (1935).
41. As noted earlier, logic would make "true" principal determinations necessary
regarding short-term loans. It is only by judicial sanction of the peculiar rule that the




is "squeezed" 42 into the early years of the loan, requiring the borrower to
pay "for more time than he has had [the use of] the money. '43  The rule
applied to such loans is uncomplicated; the court must merely ask: At the
time of the interest payment, has the borrower paid to the lender more than
ten percent interest for the length of time he has had the use of the
principal?
"Spreading" and Interest in Advance. There is some authority allowing
the "spreading" of interest paid in advance forward over the entire term
of the loan in Arkansas, 44 New Mexico,45 Oklahoma, 46 and the District
of Columbia. 47  Further, in Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit's the
Amarillo court of civil appeals "spread" interest in advance over the en-
tire ten-year term of the disputed loan to find the loan free of usury. In
reversing the court of civil appeals in Shropshire, the Texas Supreme Court
did not rely on the "squeezed" payment schedule, but rather on a usurious
acceleration provision of the same disputed loan.49 Nevertheless, the subse-
quent opinions of the commission of appeals in Dallas Trust & Savings
Bank v. Brashear'0 and Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp"' clearly defined the
Texas rule as denying the "spreadability" of interest in advance. 52
42. For this reason, such loans are referred to as "squeezed" loans. See, e.g.,
Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 135 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940).
43. Galveston & Houston Inv. Co. v. Grymes, 94 Tex. 609, 615, 63 S.W. 860, 862(1901). For analysis of the net economic positions of lender and borrower in "squeezed"
loans, see notes 68-74 infra and accompanying text.
44. Green v. Conservative Loan Co., 153 Ark. 219, 240 S.W. 13 (1922). Greeninvolved a transaction similar to that in Ramp, and the Arkansas Supreme Courtdeclared it free of usury because all the interest actually paid was less than could legally
have been collected over the ten-year period of the disputed loan. However, Green isirreconcilable with a later decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Coss Mortgage Co.
v. Jordon, 167 Ark. 34, 267 S.W. 590 (1924), which declared a virtually identical
transaction usurious, the court refusing to spread "squeezed" interest over the entire ten-
year period of the disputed loan.
45. American Inv. Co. v. Roberts, 29 N.M. 99, 218 P. 1037 (1923); American Inv.
Co. v. Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 218 P. 183 (1923).
46. Metz v. Winne, 15 Okla. 1, 79 P. 223 (1904). In this case, the interest in
advance was "squeezed" into the first year only. The decision was most likely founded
upon the Oklahoma practice of sanctioning extra first year interest on long-term loans.
See note 25 supra.
47. Montgomery Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baer, 308 A.2d 768 (D.C. App. 1973).
48. 266 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924), rev'd, 280 S.W. 181 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1926, opinion adopted), superseded, af'd on other grounds, 120 Tex. 400,
30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), motion for rehearing overruled, 120 Tex. 412, 39 S.W.2d 11, cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931).
49. Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930),
motion for rehearing overruled, 120 Tex. 412, 39 S.W.2d 11, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675(1931). The acceleration clause provided that, upon borrower's default, all interest,
accrued and unaccrued, became due and payable, and thus could be squeezed into a
shorter loan period. For a discussion of this aspect of the case see Pierce & Williams,
supra note 13, at 243-44.
50. 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted) (see facts in note 40
supra).
51. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940), discussed in text accompanying notes 35-
40 supra.
52. The loan in Brashear included an acceleration clause similar to that in Shrop-
shire; thus "squeezed" interest was not the sole reason for the court's declaring the loan
usurious. However, the Texas Supreme Court later observed that the usurious nature of
the loan in Brashear did not turn on the acceleration clause but rather on the squeezed
interest payments. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 124 Tex. 556, 559-60, 81
S.W.2d 1112, 1113 (1935). Ramp involved no such clause, the court holding the loan
usurious because "interest on the principal of the loan was 'squeezed' . . . making the
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
Cases in other jurisdictions,53 and the court of civil appeals in Shropshire,
which have allowed "spreading" of interest in advance have apparently
relied upon the rationale of opinions in cases involving front-end interest.54
None have recognized the fact that interest in advance differs from front-end
interest in that the former is actually paid before the borrower has had full
use of the principal amount of the loan while this is never the case where
front-end interest is involved. 55
Southwestern Investment Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc.5 6
The confusion of interest in advance with front-end interest arose again in
Hockley Seed, in which the terms of the loan provided for more than ten
percent interest in early years to be offset by lower rates later.5 7 The trial
court found that during the first year, and for six months of the second and
third years, the borrower paid in excess of ten percent interest,58 and that
the loan was, therefore, usurious.59 On appeal, the lender argued that, since
the total amount of interest paid over the entire life of the loan was less than
would have been paid had a straight ten percent interest been charged for
each year the loan was to run, there was no usury. 60 The argument was
rate for the first four years in excess of 10 per cent per annum." Commerce Trust Co. v.
Ramp, 135 Tex. 84, 87, 138 S.W.2d 531, 533 (1940).
53. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
54. In addition, most of these cases have given lip service to the idea that the
maximum interest "rate" for usury purposes should have no bearing on the time for
which interest payments are charged. "Thus the phrase '8 percent per annum' in section
28-3301 [D.C. CODE (Supp. 1974)] relates to the rate of interest and rate alone. It has
no bearing on the time of payment. ... Montgomery Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Baer,
308 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C. App. 1973). The conclusion that the usury laws have no
bearing on time of interest payment, however, does not logically follow from such a
construction of "rate." If time of interest payment made no difference, a lender could
conceivably collect, ab initio, all interest that would accrue over the entire term of a
loan. For example, on a ten-year loan of $100 at 10%, the lender could deliver the $100
principal to the borrower and at the same time require the borrower to return immediate-
ly the $100 as "interest" for the entire loan term, remaining liable for $100 ten years
later.
55. See notes 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
56. 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 516
S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974).
57. The schedule of payments is not stated in the opinion, which speaks only of total
principal and of four individual interest payments.
58. 511 S.W.2d at 729. Note that Hockley Seed, the borrower, was a corporation,
but the court nevertheless applied the 10% rate. In a prior decision, it was decided that
the corporate exception statute, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974)
(raising the rate on certain corporate loans to 18%), was inapplicable for the reason
that the loan was executed prior to the adoption of the new statute, and the statute was
not retroactive. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc. v. Southwestern Inv. Co., 476
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The prior opinion is
discussed in Lebowitz, Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 85, 120
(1973), and Larson, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 67, 75-76 (1973).
59. That the six-month payments in excess of 10% were usurious is somewhat
questionable. The Texas usury statute speaks in terms of interest per annum and it would
thus appear that interest could be "spread" over at least one year. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.02 (1971). However, the corporate exception statute, TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1302-2.09 (Supp. 1974), sets the maximum rate at 11/2% per month
or 18% per annum, which may be interpreted to disallow "spreading" even over a one-
year term. See Wallenstein, Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 27, 46-
47 nn.132-34 (1974). See also Loiseaux, supra note 23, at 438-39. Furthermore, the
economic effect of "squeezing" high interest in the early months of a year is no different
conceptually from the effect of "squeezing" interest in early years of a long-term loan.
See note 74 infra.
60. 511 S.W.2d at 732.
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rejected under authority of Dallas Trust & Savings Bank v. Brashear61 and
Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp:62 "[A] loan contract is considered usurious
if for the first year 63 or first few years it requires the payment of more than
the lawful rate, even though the interest over the entire loan period does
not exceed -the statutory limit."'64
Unfortunately, the loan in Hockley Seed was thought by some to have
been one involving front-end interest.63 The Supreme Court of Texas found
to the contrary, refusing writ of error, per curiam,66 in reliance upon
Commerce Trust Co. v. Ramp.67 It appears, therefore, that the rules pre-
viously discussed are still the law in Texas.
An Economic Analysis of Interest in Advance. A brief rate-of-return analy-
sis of the interest in advance -transaction will show that the Texas rule for
usury determinations, as opposed to the "spreading" concept, is a proper
one. For this purpose, it will be helpful to refer to the transaction involved
in Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co.,68 in which three percent in-
terest for the entire ten years of the loan term was "squeezed" into payments
due in the first five years. In addition, ten notes representing six percent
interest were due at the end of each year.69 Applying the "spreading" con-
cept to determine usury ("whether the contract is usurious is determined by
ascertaining whether the interest collectible for the entire loan period exceeds
the amount of interest that could be legally collected on the amount of the
principal . . . of which the borrower had the use during the period"70) the
court of civil appeals found the loan free of usury, since only nine percent, in
the aggregate, 71 was charged over -the life of the loan. What "could be legally
collected" via payments of ten percent for ten years and what was collected,
twelve percent for five years and six percent for the remaining years, were,
61. 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted), discussed in notes 40
and 52 supra.
62. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940), discussed in notes 35-40 supra and
accompanying text.
63. Cf. Bothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank & Trust Co., 120 Tex. 1, 30
S.W.2d 289 (1930), stating the special rule regarding short-term loans. Here the court of
civil appeals is apparently speaking of "squeezed" interest in the first year of a long-term
loan.
64. 511 S.W.2d at 732.
65. Four amici curiae so argued. See also Comment, supra note 22.
66. 516 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974). The court noted that the disputed loan raised "noquestion as to the spreading of front-end charges over the life of a loan ....... and
found no reversible error. Id. at 137.
67. 135 Tex. 84, 138 S.W.2d 531 (1940).
68. 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), motion for rehearing overruled, 120 Tex.
412, 39 S.W.2d 11, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). The loan transaction is better
described in the opinion of the court of civil appeals. 266 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1924).
69. The loan was in the amount of $4,200 and the schedule of payments thus
appeared.
Years 6% notes 3% notes Annual %
1-5 $ 252 $ 252 12%
6-10 252 0 6%
TOTAL $2520 $1260 9% (average)
70. 266 S.W. at 614.
71. See note 69 supra.
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however, substantially different. The three percent "squeezed" interest in the
first five years was "saved" in the last five years due to reduced payments, but
only partially so. The "squeezed" interest for the first year was recovered in
the sixth year; -the "squeezed" interest in the second year was recovered in the
seventh year, and so on. But, by the time of each recovery the borrower had
been without the use of the amount of the "squeezed" interest for five years.
So, compared with the situation had a straight-line rate been charged and
paid, the borrower was without the use of three percent interest for five years
five times. 72 The spreading concept is correct only when a straight-line rate
is charged and paid, and the court of civil appeals in Shropshire was,
therefore, in error.73 To determine the net economic positions of the borrow-
er and lender in Shropshire relative to the positions if a straight-line nine
percent interest had been paid, one could apply a basic rate of return
analysis, finding the borrower in a substantial net minus position.74
When a borrower has actually paid extra interest in early years, he is not
fully recompensed by reduced interest payments in later years. Likewise,
when a lender receives "extra" interest in early years he is not placed in
equilibrium by foregoing it in later years. Thus, the application of the
"spreading" concept to interest in advance transactions will fail to reflect
both the actual interest paid under a loan and the true economic position of
the parties.
III. USURY AND FRONT-END INTEREST
Many expenses are incurred by both lender and borrower incidental to a
loan transaction, and a lender will often require his borrower to recompense
him for his expenses. There is nothing usurious regarding such a practice.
However, when the "recompensation" of the lender turns out to be more
than the payment of bona fide charges or fees representing payment for
services rendered by some third party or compensation to the lender73 for
services or expenses other than those incurred by the actual loan of money,
the usury laws must take their place, as such charges constitute "front-end
72. Note that the borrower was "without the use of" 3%, not 6%, interest. This is
because only 3% was "squeezed." If the loan had been at a straight-line rate, the
borrower would have paid 9% per annum.
73. The decision of the court of civil appeals was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Texas, but on other grounds. 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d 282 (1930), motion for rehearing
overruled, 120 Tex. 412, 39 S.W.2d 11, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). See note 49
supra and accompanying text. The position of the court of civil appeals, as has already
been noted, is not in accord with later cases. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying
text.
74. Assuming a reasonable rate of return to be 9%, the borrower in Shropshire was
in a net minus position of $283.50. In years 1 through 5, the borrower paid $126 (3% of
the $4,200 principal) "squeezed" interest, which was recovered five years later in years 6
through 10. The borrower was, therefore, without the use of $126 for five years, five
times. Applying the assumed 9% rate of return, the net minus position is $126 X .09 X 5(years) X 5 (times), or $282.50. Of course, what is foregone by the borrower is gained
by the lender, and he is, therefore, in a net plus position of the same amount.
75. An example is the true commitment fee, which is in actuality an option
purchased by the prospective borrower by which the lender promises to set aside a




interest. '' 76 Though front-end interest is charged at the beginning of the loan
transaction, it is never actually paid at that time. The lender charging front-
end interest simply loans a reduced principal, but continues to compute
interest based upon the stated principal without any reduction due to the
front-end interest charge. 77 It is, therefore, essential to remember that in
transactions involving front-end interest, the borrower is paying interest
computed on a sum greater than the amount actually loaned to him. 78 In
addition, when the "stated" principal is repaid to the lender, it is essentially a
payment of true principal and an amount of interest attributable to the front-
end charge.79
The same holds true when the lender requires the borrower to "prepay" a
certain amount of interest via a charge usually termed "points."80 When the
76. Words of art will not determine whether a charge or fee is front-end interest or
a bona fide recompensation. Courts have generally looked to substance rather than form
in determining the nature of such payments. "Committment fees": held interest-
Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972);
In re Feldman, 259 F. Supp. 218 (D. Conn. 1966); held not interest-Regional Enterpris-
es, Inc. v. Teachers' Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 352 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965) (fee
was consideration for option to borrow); Pivot City Realty Co. v. State Say. & Trust Co.,
88 Ind. App. 222, 162 N.E. 27 (1928). "Commission": held interest-Deming Inv. Co.
v. Giddens, 41 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931, writ dism'd); held not
interest-Dewey v. American Nat'l Bank, 382 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (commission was to agent of borrower). "Service charge": held
interest-Bethke v. Idaho Say. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Idaho 410, 462 P.2d 503 (1969); Terry
v. Teachworth, 431 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); held not interest-Bettum v. Montgomery Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 Md. 360,
277 A.2d 600 (1971).
77. What actually happens was stated most simply in Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co.,
124 Tex. 564, 80 S.W.2d 939 (1935), in which the lender charged a $240 "commission"
on a loan of $6,000: "Stripped of the formalities . . . the transaction was that when[lender] paid [borrower] $6,000, [he] took it in one hand and with the other gave
back to [lender] $240. His note in the principal sum of $6,000 was given for a loan of
but $5,760." Id. at 566, 80 S.W.2d at 940.
78. Such operation was carried ad absurdum in a hypothetical posed by the Supreme
Court of Georgia in McCall v. Hefring, 116 Ga. 235, 42 S.E. 468 (1902), wherein the
lender borrowed "$500" for 15 years at 8%, paying a loan fee equal to all interest
payable over the term of the loan. "[The borrower] would not only get nothing, but
would pay the lender $100 for the privilege of executing to him his promissory note [for$500]." 42 S.W. at 472.
79. It has been contended that front-end interest is "paid" at the "front-end" or in
the first year of a loan period: "For example, if 8 percent is the stated rate of interest
and interest payments are to be made at the end of each year over the term of the loan, a
front-end fee of 3 percent obligates the borrower to pay 11 percent interest over the first
year." Comment, supra note 22, at 159 n.4. See also Montgomery Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Baer, 308 A.2d 773 (D.C. App. 1973); Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's
Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972); Pierce & Williams, supra note 13, at 246.
Simple logic will show this contention to be erroneous, that though a front-end charge
is charged at the front-end of a loan, it is not paid until the "principal" is repaid to the
lender. Allusion can be directed to child's play, where A requests of B a loan of a
quarter, agreeing to repay it upon receipt of his allowance the following week. B agrees,
but only if "You (A) will pay me a nickel today." This quarter-for-a-nickel exchange
amounts to nothing more than a loan of 20 cents. A will not pay the nickel to B until the
following week when he gives B the quarter (which is 20 cents true principal and 5 cents
front-end interest). This reasoning is essential to an understanding of the difference
between front-end interest and interest in advance. Regarding the former, it is never
actually paid until the "stated" principal is repaid, for the true principal was of a lesser
amount, "stated" principal less the front-end charge. Interest in advance entails a delivery
by the lender of the entire "stated" principal, and interest is actually paid on that amount
at the time the interest is charged. See Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 36, 69 (1968).
80. In a recent case, the Beaumont court of civil appeals made the rather amazing
statement: "[W]e hold that such 'points' are not interest within the usury statutes."
Wagner v. Austin Say. & Loan Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
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lender advances a "stated" principal amount upon the borrower's payment to
him of "points," the amount actually loaned is the "stated" principal less the
"points." Only when this "stated" principal is repaid, and only then, are the
"points" actually paid.
Rules of usury determination can best be explained by considering
amortized and unamortized loans separately.
Front-end Interest on Amortized Loans. In an amortized loan the interest
rate remains constant, but the principal declines with each payment,"' and if
the parties fail to provide otherwise, installment payments are applied first to
accrued interest and then to principal. 2 The true rate of interest is the rate
which, when applied to the true principal balance at the time each payment
is made, will result in an amortization of the entire principal and entire
interest through the stated payments required by the loan agreement.8 3
With respect to amortized loans, front-end interest problems have been
settled in Texas since 1935.84 Front-end interest is to be deducted from the
stated principal amount of the loan and the interest payments (including the
interest hidden in the stated principal) are to be applied to the true
(reduced) principal to determine if usurious interest has been charged.8 5
1975, no writ). The statement was made in the interpretation of TEX. REV. CIr. STAT.
ANN. art. 852a, § 5.07 (1964), which provides:
Every [savings and loan] association may require borrowing members
to pay all reasonable expenses incurred in the making, closing [etc.] . . .
of real estate loans . . . . In addition, associations may charge premiums
for making such loans as well as penalties for prepayments . . . . The
expenses, fees and charges authorized herein shall be in addition to the
interest authorized by law, and shall not be deemed a part of the interest
collected or agreed to be paid on such loans ....
The Wagner court apparently thought "points" fitted the category of "premium" within §
5.07. The author expresses no opinion on what was intended by the legislature as
inclusive in the definition of "premium." However, if "points" are indeed a "premium,"
and, therefore, not interest under § 5.07, there are severe constitutional problems, for §
5.07 places no limit upon the amount of such "premiums"; nor would it appear that
legislative exclusion of such an ambiguous term from interest is a proper execution of
legislative power to define interest. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. See generally notes 125-
33 infra and accompanying text.
It is believed that the correct interpretation of § 5.07 was recently disclosed in
Freeman v. Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi Aug. 29, 1975, no writ): "The Legislature, by allowing such an exception, in-
tended that, before such a charge can be made (without the same being treated as in-
terest), there must be proof that such an expense was a 'reasonable expense' and was
incurred in connection with the making of the real estate loan." Id. at 10 (emphasis by
court; slip opinion). Cf. notes 75-76 supra and accompanying text. Suffice it to say that
it would be inadvisable for a lender to assume that sundry front-end charges are "pre-
miums" and, therefore, not interest under § 5.07 because of problems of constitutional
validity. The only front-end charges which are free from the interest connotation are
those necessary to the making and performance of the loan contract.
81. Compare the situation involved in "squeezed" loans concerning interest in
advance; the interest rate decreases while principal generally remains constant.
82. Community Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fisher, 409 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1966).
83. This is the so-called American rule, as announced in Jencks v. Alexander, 11
Paige's Ch. 619 (N.Y. 1845).
84. Adleson v. B.F. Dittmar Co., 124 Tex. 564, 80 S.W.2d 939 (1935).
85. Id. at 566-67, 80 S.W.2d at 940. Oddly enough, it was the lender in Adleson who
argued that the front-end interest was interest in the first year only. This was an attempt
to fall without the two-year statute of limitations. The loan in Adleson was found
usurious, as the amortized payments provided for 11.3% interest on the true principal.
One year after Adleson the same test was used to find an amortized loan free of usury in
Eubanks v. Simpson, 90 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, writ ref'd),




In so far as the usury laws are concerned, the significance of an amortized
loan is that the rate of interest is constant and the principal declines with
each payment. Though front-end interest will reduce the principal upon
which the rate is to be computed, the rate of interest in the first payment will
be identical to that in all subsequent payments. The payments themselves
"spread" front-end interest over the term of 'the loan.86
Later cases, perhaps for the sake of simplicity,8 7 have relied on a rule
correct in application but incorrect in principle regarding usury computations
on amortized loans:88 "If the contract for the use and detention of the
principal debt is not a sum greater than such debt would produce at ten
percent per annum from the time the borrower had the use of the money
until it is repaid, it is not usurious."89 The rule is correct in application
because amortized loans 90 by definition have a constant interest rate, and if
such a rate is less than ten percent per annum, the total will obviously be less
than could be collected at ten percent for the entire loan tenure. The rule is
incorrect in principle for the reason that it fails to take into full account the
time and amount of the actual payments required by a particular transac-
tion,91 an important consideration regarding unamortized loans with fluc-
tuating interest rates.
Front-end Interest on Unamortized Loans. When the rate of interest charged
on a particular loan is not constant, or where "balloon" principal payments
are required, 92 different considerations are necessary. In Nevels v. Harris"8
a loan in the "principal amount" of $6,400 was evidenced by the borrower's
note for that amount, maturing five years after issue. Five interest coupons
were executed, each being for $51294 and due at the end of each year. A
$320 "service charge" was deducted from the initial principal advance. The
court found the "service charge" to be front-end interest 5 and deducted it
86. This is because the reduction in principal precipitated by the front-end charge is
"captured" in part each time a payment is made.
87. Computation of interest rates on amortized loans is virtually impossible without
the use of rate tables, e.g., LAKE'S MONTHLY INSTALLMENT & INTEREST TABLES (6th ed.
1971).
88. See cases cited notes 88, 92-100 infra.
89. Griffin v. B & W Fin. Co., 389 S.W.2d 350, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965,
no writ); accord, Montgomery Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baer, 308 A.2d 768, 772 (D.C.
App. 1973); Bethke v. Idaho Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 93 Idaho 410, 462 P.2d 503, 509(1969) (concurring opinion); Continental Assurance Co. v. Gibner, 119 S.W.2d 588,
591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ dism'd); Southern States Mortgage Co. v.
Lykes, 85 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd).
90. And any other loan with a constant interest rate. See notes 103-05 infra and
accompanying text.
91. The Maryland court of appeals apparently does so. See, e.g., Bettum v. Mont-
gomery Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 262 Md. 360, 277 A.2d 600, 603 (1971); B.F. Saul Co.
v. West End Park N., 250 Md. 707, 246 A.2d 591, 597 (1968). In both cases, the court
computed the actual interest rate paid and found it to be less than 8% (the legal rate).
92. "Balloon" payments refer to payments which are substantially disproportionate
to other payments required by the loan agreement. This term includes loans in which
interest only is payable over the loan term, and principal becomes due in a lump sum at
the end of the loan term. See, e.g., MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT AcT § 2.042 (Nat'l
Consumer Law Center 1973).
93. 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937).
94. This represented 8% of the stated principal of $6,400.
95. The $320 was paid directly to the lender as compensation for the loan. See note
75 supra and accompanying text.
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from the stated principal.96 In finding the loan free of usury, the court
computed the maximum legal amount of interest on a $6,080 loan for five
years97 to be more than the amount of interest actually paid.98
Thus, the court applied the rule previously discussed,99 which is cor-
rect in application but incorrect in principle. Rather than finding what rate
was actually paid, 100 the court simply found that the total sum actually paid
was less than could have been charged. The doctrine of Nevels v. Harris has
been interpreted to allow the "spreading" of front-end interest,' 0 ' whereby
such interest is applied to the entire term of the loan. Conceptually,
"spreading" is no different from the practice of computing maximum interest
that could be paid on a loan of a given principal, 0 2 and it too is generally
correct in application but incorrect in principle.
To allow "spreading" as a positive rule of law is to forget to look at the
substance of a loan-to look at what could have been done rather than what
has been done. It is a valid concept so long as the interest rate required by
the loan is constant.'10 It is not, however, unforeseeable that a loan could
involve both interest in advance and front-end interest. 10 4 Even in such a
case "spreading" would be "correct in application" if it were applied only to
the front-end interest part of the loan and not to interest in advance, which
must be treated as interest when actually paid.' 0 5
Due to confusion of interest in advance with front-end interest,106 it
96. "He, in fact, only loaned $6,400 less $320, or $6,080. We must therefore treat
this last-named figure as the real amount of the loan." 129 Tex. at 196, 102 S.W.2d at
1048.
97. Ten percent interest for five years was $3,040.
98. Interest actually paid was composed of the five $512 notes plus an additional
$320 when the principal note was paid. This aggregated $2,880.
99. See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
100. The $320 interest paid concurrently with the final stated principal was 1.05%.
The $512 yearly payments were 8.4%. Thus the actual rate paid was 9.45%.
101. Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338 (5th
Cir. 1972). Nevels v. Harris also involved usurious implications of an acceleration
clause. The court held that an acceleration clause would not render a loan usurious if the
contract provided, via the "savings clause," that upon acceleration, no unaccrued interest
would be collected. Frenchman's Creek interpreted Nevels as saying that the "savings
clause" was necessary to allow "spreading" of front-end interest. In fact, the discussion of
the "savings clause" in Nevels had no relation to the computation of interest over the life
of the loan. 129 Tex. at 198, 102 S.W.2d at 1050.
102. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
103. See note 91 supra and accompanying text -for the reason this is true regarding
amortized loans. In unamortized loans, front-end interest is actually paid when the stated
principal is paid. Since front-end interest is "rent" for the entire time for which the
borrower has the use of the true principal, Imperial Corp. of America v. Frenchman's
Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1972), it is applicable to the entire term of
forebearance.
104. The only litigated instance found by the writer which involved such a scheme is
Riverdrive Mall, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Inv., 515 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, no writ). The case was before the court of civil appeals upon the trial
court's denial of borrower's motion for a preliminary injunction restraining foreclosure
by the lender. In affirming the action of the trial court, the court of civil appeals did not
decide the usury issue, but did notice that problems would be presented 'by the
intermingling of interest in advance and front-end interest. The facts as presented by the
court are inadequate to determine whether usury was in fact present. The case has since
been settled.
105. See notes 60-75 supra and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Petitioner's Application for Writ of Error at 55-57, Southwestern Inv.
Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc., 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also note 79 supra.
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would appear advisable for courts to refrain from employing the concept of
"spreading" and to look at the interest payments actually paid or required by
a particular loan under consideration in order to guard against an improper
decision concerning a loan with both front-end interest and interest in
advance, 10 7 or improper application of "spreading" to an interest in advance
transaction.
Computation of Front-end Interest Reconsidered. There is little difficulty in
formulating a rule which will correctly apply to both front-end interest and
interest in advance. Cases considering interest in advance require that
interest is to be considered for usury purposes in the year paid. Cases
previously discussed have also established that front-end interest is to be
deducted from the stated principal to find the actual amount of the loan. To
test a loan for usury, whether it involves front-end interest, interest in
advance, or both, it is necessary only to find whether the terms of the loan
require payments in excess of the legal rate of interest on the true amount of
the loan for the length of time that such payments represent. With the
exception of "interest in advance" on short term loans,' 08 the test will apply
correctly to any type of transaction considered in this Comment and will
avoid the possibility of error when considering a hybrid loan scheme.
IV. HouSE BILL 351
In its regular session the Sixty-Fourth Legislature of Texas enacted an
amendment to the Texas usury laws'0 9 providing, inter alia, 10 that:
On any loan or agreement to loan secured or to be secured, in whole
or in part, by a lien, mortgage, security interest, or other interest in
or with respect to any interest in real property, determination of the
rate of interest for the purpose of determining whether the loan is
usurious under all applicable Texas laws shall be made by amortiz-
107. For example, assume a five-year loan of $1,000, with five notes, representing
6% interest, due at the end of each year; with two notes, representing 2% interest for
the five-year term but due at the end of each of the first two years; and with a five-point
($50) front-end charge. The actual payment schedule will look like this:
Interest Principal
6% notes 2% notes Points Total
Year
1 $60 $50 $ 0 $110 $ 0
2 60 50 0 110 0
3 60 0 0 60 0
4 60 0 0 60 0
5 60 0 50 110 950
Total Interest $450
The loan is usurious, because of "squeezed" payments in the first two years. However, if
the rule "incorrect in principle" (see text accompanying note 89 supra) were applied, it
would be found that the total interest paid over the life of the loan was less than would
have been paid had a straight 10% interest been charged on a loan of $950.
108. See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
109. The regular session of the 64th Legislature adjourned on June 2, 1975.
110. The legislation also provided for increased interest rates on loans exceeding
$500,000, ch. 26, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 47-48, to be codified as TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b), and interest "refunds" on pretermitted loans, id., to
be codified as art. 5069-1.07(a).
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ing, prorating, allocating, and spreading, in equal parts during the
period of the full stated term of the loan, all interest at any time con-
tracted for, charged, or received from the borrower in connection with
the loan."'
The amendment was intended to codify decisions in Texas and other
jurisdictions which purportedly allowed the "spreading" of front-end interest
to determine usury. 1 2 However, "all interest at any time contracted for,
charged, or received" 113 would certainly include interest in advance, and
would, therefore, appear to be subject to the same statutory "amortizing,
prorating, allocating and spreading" 1 4 as is front-end interest.
As has already been discussed, while "spreading" may be justified as
applied to the calculation of interest rates precipitated by front-end inter-
est, 1 5 it is inaccurate and inappropriate in the interest in advance or
"squeezing" situation. 1 6 Because the lender receives "squeezed" interest in
the early years of the loan term, the application of "spreading" fails to reflect
the actual rate of interest. 117
Was the "Spreading" of Interest in Advance Intended? Throughout ,the
legislative history of House Bill 351 appears the statement that the bill does
not change the statutory rate of interest. 118 The overriding intent of the bill
111. Id.
112. "[W]hat we are doing by the interest amortization in the first provision is just
codifying what the existing law is." Statement of Mr. Larry Temple, representative of
Texas Mortgage Bankers Association, Minutes of the Economic Development Committee
of the Senate, 64th Legislature of Texas, at 7 (March 10, 1975).
A virtually identical bill was passed by the 63rd Legislature of Texas, Senate Bill No.
209 (1973), but was vetoed by the Governor. Proclamation of the Governor, June 16,
1973. On Senate Bill No. 209 see generally Wallenstein, supra note 59, at 47-48.
Referring to the bill, Senator Bill Patman, in a letter to the Governor, stated that "S.B.
209 was passed under an explanation that it allowed the spread[ing] of 'origination fees'
and points that are charged in the first year of the loan throughout the loan." Letter
from Senator Bill Patman to Governor Dolph Briscoe, May 24, 1973, at 3.
113. Ch. 26, § 1, [19751 Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 47-48, to be codified as TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(a).
114. Id. See also TEXAS OBSERVER, Mar. 28, 1975, at 11-12.
115. Notes 84-106 supra and accompanying text.
116. Note 74 supra and accompanying text.
117. Refer to the economic comparison of "spreading" and true computation regard-
ing interest in advance, notes 68-74 supra and accompanying text.
118. "[H.B. 351] would limit interest rates plus points to a maximum of 10%." Bill
Analysis, "What the Bill Proposes to Do," H.B. 351, 64th Leg. (Second Official House
Printing, Feb. 19, 1975). In committee hearings, the following discussion took place
between Senator Bill Patman and Larry Temple, representative of Texas Mortgage
Bankers Association:
Patman: .. . And this is the important part [of a prior statement by
the House sponsor of H.B. 351], 'there is no way this bill can amend,
change, or affect the constitutional 10 percent ceiling.' Do you agree
with that?
Temple: Yes, sir.
Patman: If you will put that in this bill, I will vote for it.
Temple: Well, Senator, I think it is in there.
I think it is implicit in there and I don't see any need to change the bill.
[N]obody shows us where it changes the constitutional ceiling and I don't
know of a lawyer around who has written anything to indicate that he
thinks it does change the constitutional ceiling.
Minutes of the Economic Development Committee of the Senate 7-8 (Mar. 10, 1975).
See also TEX. S.J. 474 (1975).
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was to codify the "spreading" of front-end interest, 119 due to confusion
regarding judicial allowance of the practice following Southwestern Investment
Co. v. Hockley County Seed & Delinting, Inc.120 There is, however, substan-
tial evidence that at least some members of the legislature and lobbyists knew
that the express language of the amendment allowed "spreading" of interest
in advance.'21 Nevertheless, the available legislative history evidences no
intent to increase the statutory rate of interest by "spreading" interest paid in
advance.
Constitutional Validity. The Constitution of Texas provides that:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license
and regulate lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates, of in-
,terest; provided, however, in the absence of legislation fixing maxi-
mum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate of interest than
ten per centum (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious .... 122
It is therefore arguable that, even though House Bill 351 does allow the
collection of usurious interest, it is a valid exercise of legislative power to fix
maximum rates. Legislative allowance of collection of more than the maxi-
mum rate is not, however, the same as legislative determination of the
maximum rate. 128 Another portion of the bill signifies what the legislature
may lawfully prescribe. That portion provides that persons borrowing $500,-
000 or more may be charged the same rate of interest as corporations. 24
In State v. Community Finance & Thrift Corp.'2 5 the court of civil
appeals considered the constitutionality of the Certificate Plan Act,' 26 which
provided that, as a condition to making a loan, a lender could require an
installment borrower to purchase an "investment certificate" which equalled
the amount of the cash advance of the loan plus ten percent interest
(essentially a statutory front-end interest allowance).' 2 7 Finding that loans
made pursuant to the Act could result in collection of more than ten percent
119. See note 110 supra.
120. 511 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam, 516
S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1974). It has already been noted that the confusion, notes 65-66, 78-
79 supra and accompanying text, was unwarranted, since Hockley Seed involved "[n]o
question as to the spreading of front-end charges over the life of a loan ..... 516
S.W.2d at 137.
121. See TEX. S.J. 474-75 (1975); TEXAS OBSERVER, Mar. 28, 1975, at 11-12 ("the
bill effectively avoids the constitutional ban against interest rates above 10 percent").
The lobbying effort of the banking industry in the 64th Legislature was tainted by
alleged violations of the Lobby Control Act. Dallas Times Herald, Apr. 17, 1975, § A, at
7, cols. 6-8.
122. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11. Proposed constitutional amendments are substan-
tially identical. S.J.R. 11, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess., to be codified as TEx. CONST. art.
X, § 22.
123. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
Community Finance is discussed infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
124. Ch. 26, § 1, [1975] Tex. Laws Reg. Sess. 48, to be codified as TEx. REV. Cv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.07(b).
125. 334 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960), writ ref'd n.r.e., per curiam,
161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961).
126. Ch. 472, §§ 1-6, [1951] Tex. Laws 832-34 (repealed 1963).
127. The transaction allowed was complex, and is not worthy of detailed considera-
tion here. Essentially it provided that the lender could require a borrower of $1,000 to
execute a note for $1,100, due at the end of the loan term. The loan was of the
installment nature (declining principal) and, therefore, most any short-term loan was
usurious. See Harrell v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 341 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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interest, the court of civil appeals held the Act unconstitutional. However, the
Act was held unconstitutional under the 1891 usury amendment to the
constitution of 1876;128 the amendment provided simply that all contracts
calling for more than ten percent interest were usurious, and contained no
provision allowing the legislature to fix maximum rates, as does the present
constitutional provision.129 The per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court of
Texas'30 did discuss the effect of the present constitution on the holding of
the court of civil appeals.
While application for writ of error was pending in Community Finance,
the Texas Constitution's usury provision was amended to its present form.
The supreme court was, therefore, faced with lenders' arguments that even if
the Certificate Plan Act was unconstitutional, it had been validated by
constitutional amendment, allowing legislative alteration of the legal rate.
The court held that it was not required to consider the rather sticky question
of "vitalization by a constitutional amendment,"'' 1 since the Act did "not
purport to define interest and in our opinion cannot be regarded as an
attempt by the Legislature to fix maximum rates of interest. 132
At the close of its opinion in Community Finance the supreme court
definitively stated:
Petitioners' argument assumes that without establishing any ceiling on
interest the Legislature may legalize a subterfuge which enables lenders
to charge varying rates in excess of ten per cent per annum, but this
is not so. The constitutional amendment provides that in the absence
of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater
rate than ten per cent per annum shall be deemed usurious. In our
opinion [the Certificate Plan Act] would be unconstitutional if adopted
now before maximum rates have been fixed by the Legislature. 133
The language is clearly applicable to House Bill 351; if construed, as its
express language seems to require, to allow "spreading" of interest in
advance and to permit thereby the collection of more than ten percent
interest, the bill is unconstitutional. 3 4
V. CONCLUSION
Interest in advance and front-end interest are no more nor less than
schemes in avoidance of the usury laws. However, when the market rate of
interest exceeds the legal rate, such schemes tend toward necessity. In the
case of interest in advance, the lender must assure himself that his borrower
will not seek retribution at some future time, for Texas courts have virtually
assured the borrower's victory. The interest in advance transaction cannot
stand even under recent amendments to the Texas usury laws, for amend-
ments so construed would violate the Texas Constitution.
128. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 11 (1891).
129. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.
130. Community Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. State, 161 Tex. 619, 343 S.W.2d 232 (1961),
discussed in Pearce & Williams, supra note 13, at 256.
131. Id. at 621, 343 S.W.2d at 233.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 622, 343 S.W.2d at 234.
134. The amendment contains the usual severability clause; therefore, other provi-
sions, note 110 supra, will stand.
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Though this Comment has discussed several instances in which front-end
charges were fairly calculated and found in compliance with the law, front-
end interest is, without question, merely a device to make a loan contract
appear to be something that it is not. A contract which represents a loan,
accompanied by sundry front-end charges, states a greater amount of money
loaned at a lower rate of interest than in actuality has occurred. It has been
argued that, in a commercial context, the parties know what they are doing
when they enter into such loans, and should, therefore, be free to do so.135
Though the courts, lenders, and most borrowers are unfoiled by the imposi-
tion of front-end interest, a continuation of the scheme still constitutes a
material misrepresentation to the uninformed. If front-end interest did in fact
serve some legitimate purpose, '3 6 there might be a sufficient ground for the
continuance of the practice, but legitimacy fails to be one of its virtues. The
Sixty-Fourth Legislature's sanction of the use of front-end interest is, there-
fore, misdirected. It relieves no pressure exerted by the usury laws upon
legitimate commercial practices.
What is necessary, if the public and commercial approval of the purpose
of the usury laws is to be restored, is to raise the legal rate of interest to a
realistic level. Were lenders able to legally charge a rate of interest which
would permit them to make a legitimate profit upon the forebearance of
money, devices in evasion and avoidance of the law would be unnecessary.
The legal rate of interest should be raised to a level well above the market
rate but below the level of clear unconscionability, and schemes in evasion
and avoidance of the law should be legislatively proscribed.'l 7 Few can be
injured by the allowance of honest profit.
135. See, e.g., Loiseaux, supra note 23, at 442-43.
136. It has been argued that front-end interest is a legitimate tool for avoiding tax
liability in the first year of the loan. Section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code allows a
deduction for "all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness." INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a). In 1969 the Internal Revenue Service recognized that
"points" could constitute payment for the use of money and ruled that such charges could
be deducted as interest. Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 54. The service did not say
when the deduction was allowable. In a later ruling the service determined that points
would not be considered to cause a material distortion of income when paid out of the
separate funds of the borrower, and accordingly were deductible in the year "paid." Rev.
Rul. 69-582, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 29. However, in the cases discussed in this Comment,
"points" were not "paid" in the first year of the loan but were merely deducted from the
principal advance. A recent article on the subject is illustrative:
In some cases, a lender . . . will deduct the amount charged the bor-
rower for the points from the amount of the loan. The deduction of
the points from the loan in this manner does not constitute payment of
the points by the [borrower] in the year of settlement.
Bedell, The Interest Deduction: Its Current Status, N.Y.U. 32D INST. ON FED. TAX. 1117,
1120 (1974). "Points" not paid out of the separate funds of the borrower will be denied
first-year deduction as a material distortion of income. Rev. Rul. 69-643, 1968-2 CuM.
BULL. 76. See also Asimow, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 36
(1968); Comment, The Prepaid Interest Deduction Viewed from the Perspective of Real
Estate Transactions, 29 Sw. L.J. 412 (1975) (The author questions the validity of the
Internal Revenue Service's position, but concludes, "the advisability of taking a prepaid
interest deduction remains questionable at best." Id. at 430).
137. Francis Bacon was in accord more than three centuries ago, making a similar
argument for the same reasons: "If it be objected that this doth in a sort authorize usury,
which before was in some places but permissive, the answer is that it is better to mitigate
usury by declaration than to suffer it to rage by connivance." F. BACON, supra note 3.
